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Should Lawyers Stick To Their Last?
JusTN A. STANLEY*
My own role in this Symposium is a limited one. As I understand it, I
am to make some comments with respect to what has already been said.
This is to be done briefly, and a wide-ranging discussion about profession-
alism and commercialism is to be avoided.
I will try to put the large law firm in perspective, while granting that its
effect on the profession and on legal education may be disproportionate.
There are now upward of 655,000 people admitted to practice in the
United States. Of these approximately 50 percent are members of the
American Bar Association.
Figures compiled by Barbara Curran and published in 19851 by the
American Bar Foundation indicate that in 1985 approximately 75 percent
of private practioners either practice alone or in firms having ten members
or less. 2 If we assume that no significant shift has occurred since 1985 and
that 650,000 lawyers are now in practice, it follows that some 490,000
practice either alone or with firms of ten members or less.
As we go up the scale, the results are consistent. Eighty-nine percent of
all lawyers in private practice either practice alone or are in firms of 50
members or less.' Conversely, only eleven percent are in firms of over 50. 4
Today, in large urban centers such as New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles,
a firm of 50 members probably would not be considered large. Certainly
one of ten or less would not be so considered.
According to Curran's 1980 study, if we move to firms of 100 or more,
it is estimated that they account for perhaps 0.2 percent of all the firms,
with a very small number of lawyers in the aggregate. 5
Yet they are powerful and the effect of what they do goes far beyond
their numerical strength. Even so, we should know that they are not the
whole Bar and that what they say or do is not automatically the final word
on any matter.
One thing they clearly set in motion was the high salaries now being paid
to associates just out of law school. Although, so far as I know, there was
never any agreement among large firms in any city, actual. payments shave
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generally been pretty uniform for a number of years, while differing
somewhat from city to city. My information is that because one firm in
New York had a major case which required a substantial number of
associates who would have to work on nothing else but that case for a long
period of time,and who were to office in a suburban area, that firm offered
extremely high salaries. The results could have been predicted. Their com-
petition followed suit and matched or even exceeded those offers. That had
and continues to have a widespread effect, not just as to starting salaries
in that city but across the country. Further, it had an effect on salaries of
older associates and on a demand from the firms to increase billable hours.
In turn this affected charges to clients. It may have affected the way in
which some firms treated the matter of pro bono work by associates and
partners.
Even some law school students are questioning how sensible or how silly
present starting salaries are.
Although I am heartily in favor of paying fair and reasonable compen-
sation, I think that what has happened is, over all, not a good thing for
the profession.
The big firms are, in fact, getting bigger, and it is true that they have
achieved unprecedented size. Clearly, if the current trend continues, the
practice may consist of big firms and small firms-with nothing in between.
However, a word of caution would not be misplaced. I think there is a
rule of evidence to the effect that a state of facts, once shown to exist, will
be presumed to continue.
But there is a rule of life that says nothing is forever, except the certainty
of change.
I am not wise enough to say how long the current trend will continue;
but I am experienced enough to say it will not last and will be subject to
change.
In the expansionist role of the large law firms, they have branched out
into other activities, such as those described so well by Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Two newspaper articles on this subject-one of which appeared in the
National Law Journal on October 21, 1985 and the other in the Washington
Post on March 13, 1986-will give you a more detailed description of what
is going on.
In some instances, you will observe that some of the firms have formed
interdisciplinary partnerships; in others they have acquired businesses; in
others they have formed business entities and, through partners in their
firms, actually operate those businesses.
Now this may be fun and exciting for the participating lawyers, at least
so long as the economic enterprises prosper; but I think there is a serious
question as to whether or not it is good for our profession.
I assume we would all agree that every lawyer has at least one basic duty:
to serve his or her client with the utmost fidelity and competence, letting
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nothing interfere with that save only the overriding obligation to the system
of justice. That means, at the least, that no personal interest of the lawyer
may stand in the way of serving a client.
When law firms engage in the kinds of business activities that have been
described, two fundamental problems must be considered. One is the obvious
one of conflict of interest. If a business entity controlled by a law firm
gives a client of that firm bad advice and the client suffers, where dp the
loyalties of the law firm belong and where, as a practical matter, will they
go? It seems to me that it is not enough to say the client is free to choose
his or her own lawyer. Neither is so-called "full disclosure" enough. 6
I am acutely aware of a situation where a law firm regularly invests in
equities in real estate development projects of a client. Full disclosure has
been made. But the law firm and the client are obviously in positions of
potential conflict, and if a deal craters the conflicts will be shockingly real.
What becomes of the duty of the law firm to its client under these
circumstances?
The second fundamental problem is whether or not lawyers should engage
in these business activities at all.
In an opinion written in 1955, Justice Jacobs of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey observed, "Perhaps society would be better served if practicing
attorneys were to remain full-time lawyers rather than become part-time
business men. ' 7
There is much to be said for this. Certainly there is challenge enough in
the law to suit any person. Lawyers perform functions which are vital to
the proper functioning of our democracy, and we are given a monopoly to
do so. There is fun in the law too. And if a lawyer's work is done well,
there is not only intellectual satisfaction, but a comfortable livelihood. There
is most likely, however, not a fortune.
England is now wrestling with the problem of whether or not to permit
lawyers to participate in interdisciplinary partnerships. My understanding is
that the barristers have said no but the solicitors have not decided.8
I agree that, with the possible exception of the conduct of litigation,
lawyers are problem solvers; but that is not new. Perhaps the problems are
6. See CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL REspONSmILIY, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, Rule 5-104(a)
(1985).
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have
conflicting interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his
professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client
has consented after full disclosure.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. In Re Carlsen, 17 N.J. 338, 346, 111 A.2d 393, 397 (1955).
8. Letter from John Mottram, Chief Executive, General Council of the Bar, to Justin A.
Stanley, Esq. (Sept. 29, 1987) (enclosing Comments on Behalf of the London Common Law




more complex now and often require the contribution of more disciplines.
However, they can be resolved in different ways. One is to call in the other
disciplines as needed. Another is to involve law firms in business activities-
where potential conflicts are rife and where the principal aim of the lawyer's
conduct may be to make money for the firm. This, of course, is a far cry
from a primary dedication to maintain and improve the system of justice
under which we live.
In an article in the Northern Illinois University Law Review,9 I addressed
the question posed by Justice Jacobs and I considered how the business
activities of law firms might be controlled. With your permission, I would
like to quote from that article:
The governing courts in the several states and in the District of Columbia
would have to adopt rules of professional conduct dealing with the problem.
Three possible alternatives seem to be available.
First, the rules could proscribe the engagement by practicing lawyers in
all business activity, with such exceptions as the courts might permit. This
would be similar to the regulations now governing the English barrister.' 0
Second, the rules could prohibit entering into business transactions with
clients. This would be similar to the rules now governing Certified Public
Accountants and would largely eliminate the relevance of "full disclosure"
of conflicts."
Third, the rules could create a supervisory body or could delegate to
disciplinary commissions authority to pass upon, in advance, all intended
business activities of lawyers and law firms. This would be administratively
more difficult and more expensive than either of the other alternatives.
Among other things, it would require the creation of guidelines by the
courts and building up of its own case law.
Constitutional challenges could be expected to all three suggestions, with
the greatest being directed toward the first. Presumably, the claim would
be asserted that the right to practice law, like any other occupation, is a
9. 8 N. ILL. U.L. Rav. 17, 29-30.
10. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE BAR OF ENOLAND AND WALES; 35, 57-58 and Annexes
4, 7 (1985). Permitted supplementary occupations include:
1. part-time public appointments such as judicial or quasi-judicial offices,
arbitrators, membership in parole boards, Royal Commissions, Press Councils or
local authorities;
2. part-time legal services such as advising producers of plays on legal matters
concerning their productions, reviewing Parliamentary Bills, coaching students,
lecturing and writing, editing and reviewing books and periodicals;
3. part-time commercial activities (which include only the following activities)
non-executive directorships of companies, chairmanship or membership on boards
of cooperative societies, names at Lloyds, and activities as landlords or rented
accommodations.
Id.
11. AMERiCAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
ETncs, RULEs OF CONDUCT, Rule 101 (1975).
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liberty or property interest protected by the federal Constitution and by
many state constitutions, and that to prevent one who is engaged in business
activities from practicing law improperly interferes with that constitutional
right and violates the dueprocess and equal protection clauses. Such an
argument might seriously misconstrue the law. The federal Constitution
does not create property or liberty interests; they are created and defined
by independent sources such as state law. Thus, while a right to practice
law could not be arbitrarily denied by a state, a state may impose conditions
on the practice of law which are rationally related to the "fitness or capacity
to practice law" and not illegally discriminatory.
What will happen in the future, none of us knows. What is clear is that
the present business activities of some large law firms should be carefully
and objectively studied to see whether or not the ends of justice would be
better served were such activities either more closely controlled or pro-
scribed.' 2 There are, for example, obvious differences between having econ-
omists on the staff of a law firm and having an "affiliate" of the firm
give advice in other disciplines to the clients of the firm. There are also
differences between having economists on the staff of the firm and having
the economists as partners. The examples could be multiplied; but they
illustrate the kinds of questions that should be addressed. The ultimate aim
should be to see what best serves the interest of the system of justice.
12. See REPoRT oF THE ComlmssxoN ON PRoFssIoNALsm TO = BoARD oF GovERNoRS A
nm HousE OF DEGATES OF m AmEwcAN BAR ASSOCATON, 112, F.R.D. 243, 280-281.
1989]

